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Avalanche photodiode based single photon detectors, as crucial and practical components, are
widely used in quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. For effective detection, most of these
SPDs are operated in the gated mode, in which the gate is added to obtain high avalanche gain, and
is removed to quench the avalanche. The avalanche transition region (ATR) is a certain existence in
the process of adding and removing the gate. We first experimentally investigate the characteristic
of the ATR, including in the commercial SPD and high-speed SPD, and then propose an ATR
attack to control the detector. In the experiment of hacking the plug-and-play QKD system, Eve
only introduces less than 0.5 % quantum bit error rate, and almost leaves no traces of her presence
including the photocurrent and afterpulse probability. We finally give possible countermeasures
against this attack.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables two remote
parties, commonly known as Alice and Bob, to share a
string of secure keys [1]. The eavesdropper, Eve, can
not obtain any information without introducing errors.
As the first application of quantum information in wide
fields, the unconditional security of the BB84 QKD pro-
tocol has been proven [2–6].
Generally, the source, modulators, and detectors are
the main components in a QKD system. The models of
these components are ideal in security proof, while these
components have imperfections in real life. The gaps
between ideal models and imperfect components would
leave loopholes for Eve, and threaten the practical se-
curity [7–29]. For instance, the original BB84 protocol
requires a perfect single photon source, but most prac-
tical QKD systems employed the weak coherent source.
The existence of multi-photon states give Eve a chink to
implement the photon number splitting attack, until the
decoy-state method was proposed [9, 10, 35–37].
Single photon detector (SPD) is an indispensable com-
ponent for a BB84 QKD system, but as a complex one
at the receiver’s part, there are many loopholes that
Eve can exploit to hack the system [15–29]. Recently,
a series of hacking, named as detector control attacks,
have been proposed [21–29]. One of the most famous at-
tacks is detector blinding attack [21–25], the eavesdrop-
per blinds the SPDs, and then remotely controls them to
steal all keys without increasing the quantum bit error
∗ wshuang@ustc.edu.cn
rate (QBER), but it requires bright illumination. More-
over, faint trigger pulses can also be used to control SPDs
without extra blinding light, but the increased QBER is
relatively high (>12%) to be discovered [27].
Several strategies are proposed to defense these detec-
tor control attacks. The most attractive approach is mea-
surement device independent protocol [38, 39], it can re-
move all detector side channel attacks, but challenges of
experiment and relative lower secure key rates need to be
solved before commercial application. Another approach
is improving the existing systems, such as monitoring
optical illumination [21, 34], photocurrent [30–32], and
afterpulse [33], or randomly removing gates to check the
clicks [26]. The improving approach minimizes changes
on the original system. But some of these methods do not
close all underlying loopholes or have not strictly theo-
retical proof, new proposed attacks may defeat the QKD
system.
Here we propose an avalanche transition region (ATR)
attack on gated-mode avalanche photodiode (APD) de-
tectors, which is widely used in QKD systems [40]. When
the gate is on, the detector is in Geiger mode and sensi-
tive to the single photon. When the gate is off, it is in
linear mode and can not detect the single photon. The
ATR refers to the region transitioned from Geiger mode
to linear mode. When weak multiphoton signals arrive at
this region, the probability of being detected depends on
the delay in the ATR and incident flux at matching basis
and mismatching basis, Eve can implement ATR attack
to steal all keys but introduce almost no errors (< 0.5%).
Moreover, since the incident flux is faint and avalanche
gain factor in ATR is relatively small, the strategies of
monitoring illumination, photocurrent and afterpulse are
inoperative.
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2II. ATR ATTACK MODEL
For an APD detector operated in the Geiger mode, a
reverse bias voltage should be above the breakdown volt-
age (VBD) when the gate is on. As is shown in Fig. 1,
in normal operation, a single-photon pulse arrives in the
gate and creates a detectable macrosopic current signal.
Then the gate should be removed to quench the avalanche
[40]. In reality, there must be a voltage transition in the
process of removing the gate. Since the avalanche gain
factor decreases with reduction of the bias voltage on
APD [41, 42, 44], this voltage transition region is also
an avalanche transition region (ATR). In this region, a
single-photon pulse cannot be detected, but a multipho-
ton pulse (hundreds to thousands photons) would cre-
ate a superimposed avalanche signals, whose amplitude
is comparable with the one of a single avalanche signal
created by a single-photon pulse in the gate.
The ATR of the APD detector is experimentally char-
acterized by measurement of detection probability at dif-
ferent positions and with different incident fluxes. The
commercial SPD (id201, id Quantique) under test is
based on the InGaAs APD and set 2.5 ns gate width.
Under 1 MHz gating rate, this SPD is illuminated by a
variable intensity pulse with 1 MHz repetition rate, and
30 ps temporal width at 1550 nm. As shown in Fig. 2,
the detection probability of this SPD changes a lot with
the position and incident flux. When the incident flux
is 0.1 photon/pulse (the black curve in Fig. 2(a)), the
delay between the incident pulse and gate signal is care-
fully tuned to get maximum detection probability. The
maximum detection probability is about 1.33 % (corre-
sponding to 13.4 % detection efficiency) during the gate
signal region, and the corresponding delay time is set as
the zero point. To show the characteristics of the ATR
clearly, we only display the tested data in the range from
the position of 1.06 ns delay to 1.26 ns delay in Fig. 2.
When the incident flux increases to hundreds of photons
level, the corresponding detection probability increases a
lot even in the ATR, but reduces as the position away
from the gate signal. In the region from 1.11 ns to 1.21
ns, the reducing ranges of the detection probability with
different incident fluxes are different, for instance, the
FIG. 1. Conceptual avalanche transition region. VBD de-
notes the breakdown voltage.
range is from 98.7 % to 0.52 % for 890 photons/pulse
flux (red curve of Fig. 2(a)), from 18.6 % to 0.04 % for
445 photons/pulse flux (blue curve of Fig. 2(a)), and
remains at the dark count probability level for 0.1 pho-
tons/pulse flux (black curve of Fig. 2(a)). Furthermore,
the detection probability is also tested with increase of
incident flux for five given positions in the ATR (their de-
lay values are 1.06 ns, 1.11 ns, 1.16 ns, 1.21 ns, 1.26 ns,
respectively). For each curves in Fig. 2(b), the detection
probability starts rising gently, then increasing steeply,
and finally slowing down to saturation. It is obvious that
the steepness of the increase of detection probability is
weakened as the position in the ATR is far away from
the gate signal. The farther in the ATR the position is,
the lower the bias voltage on APD is, the smaller the
avalanche gain factor is, then more incident photons are
needed to create a superimposed signal with the same
amplitude.
FIG. 2. Characteristic of ATR. (a) The detection proba-
bility versus delay position with different incident fluxes. (b)
The detection probability versus incident flux of the pulse at
different delay positions.
The property that the detection probability increases
steeply with the incident flux in the ATR would be used
by Eve to control the APD detector operated in the gated
mode. Taking the position of 1.16 ns delay for example,
the detection probability is 26.2 % when the incident flux
is 890 photons/pulse, and reduces to 0.083 % when the
incident flux halves to 445 photons/pulse. Thus in or-
der to control Bob’s detector, Eve could send encoded
multiphoton pulses with 890 photons/pulse flux to Bob
(assume Bob’s decoding components are lossless), and
3make these pulses arrive at the detector with the posi-
tion of 1.16 ns delay. If Eve and Bob select matching
bases, these encoded multiphoton pulses have high prob-
ability to be detected. If Eve and Bob select opposite
bases, half flux of these encoded multiphoton pulses hit
the detector, and cause very low probability to be de-
tected. After Bob publicly acknowledges his detected
signals, Eve would have almost identical bases choices
and bit values with Bob. That means Eve could steal
almost all information of the secure keys shared between
Alice and Bob, but leave almost no trace if she employed
such an attack, which is named as ATR attack.
ATR attack is a general challenge for QKD systems
with APD detectors operated in the gated-mode, in
which the ATR is a necessary existence. Except for the
widely-used commercial InGaAs SPD, two types of the
homemade SPD have also tested to characterize the ATR.
One is similar to id201, operating at 1 MHz, the other is
using the sine-wave filtering method, operating at 1 GHz
[47]. The same as above, the delay with the maximum de-
tection probability at 0.1 photons/pulse is set as the zero
point. For 1 MHz homemade SPD, at the delay of 1.09
ns, the detection probability is 21.5 % when the incident
flux is 890 photons/pulse, and reduces to 0.107 % when
the incident flux halves to 445 photons/pulse. When the
incident flux is 1000 photons/pulse, the detection proba-
bility is 36.3 %, and reduces to 0.29 % when the incident
flux halves to 500 photons/pulse. For 1 GHz homemade
SPD, at the delay of 300 ps, the detection probability is
40 % when the incident flux is 1000 photons/pulse, and
reduces to 1.53 % when the incident flux halves to 500
photons/pulse.
III. ATTACKING EXPERIMENT ON THE
QKD SYSTEM
The ATR attacking experiment is demonstrated on the
plug-and-play QKD system [45], similar to the commer-
cial QKD system id3110 Clavis2. The upper part of Fig.
3 shows the schematic setup of the system working in the
normal operation, and BB84 protocol is implemented. To
be simple and precise, four phases { 0, pi2 , pi, 3pi2 } are
randomly modulated at Bob’s site, thus only one SPD
is needed to implement the whole BB84 protocol. The
above measured id201 is used to detect the output signal
of the 50/50 beam splitter (BS) at Bob’s site.
Combing with an intercept-resend strategy, Eve can
steal Alice and Bob’s secret keys without being discov-
ered. Eve’s setup is shown in the bottom part of Fig. 3,
which consists of Eve-Bob and Eve-Alice. First, Eve-Bob
sends strong pulses to Alice, and randomly chooses one
of { 0, pi2 , pi, 3pi2 } phases after receiving the coding signals
from Alice. From the responses of the SPD and the cho-
sen phases, Eve can guess the phases that Alice encodes
on the pulses, though the possibility of correct guess is
50 %. Then, Eve-Alice intercepts the strong pulses from
Bob, and modulates the guessed phases on these pulses,
FIG. 3. Experimental demonstration of ATR attack on the
plug-and-play QKD system. The original system is composed
of Alice and Bob (upper part). And Eve’s setup consists of
Eve-Alice and Eve-Bob (bottom part). LD, laser diode; CIR,
circulator; BS, beam splitter; DL, delay line; PM, phase mod-
ulator; PBS, polarization beam splitter; CD, classical detec-
tor; VOA, variable optical attenuator; VDL, variable delay
line; OS, optical switch; FM, Faraday mirror.
FIG. 4. Detection tree of ATR attack combined with an
intercept-resend strategy. In subfigures, each column indi-
cates the phase the one chooses. The detection counts marked
by red colour indicate error counts introduced by Eve.
and resends these multiphoton pulses to Bob. The key
of the ATR attack is that Eve-Alice should carefully con-
trol the delay of these coding pulses to make them arrive
at the ATR of Bob’s SPD, and also the incident flux of
these pulses based on the characteristic of the ATR of
SPD. The variable delay line (VDL) and variable optical
attenuator (VOA) in Fig. 3 are used to tune the delay
and incident flux of the coding pulses. And the optical
switch (OS) is used to control the resending number of
multiphoton pulses. As shown in the detection tree of the
ATR attack (see Fig. 4), the pulses intercepted by Eve-
Alice have very high (or zero) probability to be detected
by Bob’s SPD if the phase difference between Eve-Alice
and Bob is 0 (or pi), and the counts of Bob’s SPD are
denoted as C0 and Cpi, respectively, when Eve and Bob
choose the matching bases; the pulses intercepted by Eve-
4Alice have very low probability to be detected by Bob’s
SPD if the phase difference between Eve-Alice and Bob
is pi2 or
3pi
2 , and these counts are denoted as Cpi/2 and
C3pi/2, respectively, when Eve and Bob choose the oppo-
site bases. Thus QBER of the attacked QKD system can
be given as
QBER =
C3pi/2 + Cpi/2 + 2Cpi
2(C0 + Cpi/2 + Cpi + C3pi/2)
. (1)
Note that since four phases are randomly modulated
and only one SPD is used at Bob’s site, and similar pro-
cesses are also treated at Eve’s site, Cpi corresponds to the
error counts coming from apparatus imperfections [43].
When Eve-Alice and Bob choose the matching bases and
their phase difference is pi, very small part of the mul-
tiphoton pulses would hit the SPD, and the detection
probability of this small flux at ATR is very close to 0,
so Cpi is almost equal to 0. When Eve-Alice and Bob
choose the opposite bases, we have Cpi/2 = C3pi/2. Sup-
pose Eve-Alice resends M multiphoton pulses per sec-
ond, and the detection probability of Bob’s SPD is de-
noted as Pf with full incident flux, and Ph with half inci-
dent flux, the counts can be expressed as C0 =
1
4M · Pf ,
Cpi/2 = C3pi/2 =
1
4M ·Ph. Then Eq. (1) can be simplified
by
QBER ' Cpi/2
C0 + 2Cpi/2
=
Ph
Pf + 2Ph
. (2)
FIG. 5. Bob’s detection counts versus phase difference under
different perspectives.
In the ATR attacking experiment, Eve-Alice carefully
tunes her VDL to make the resending multiphoton pulses
arrive at the position of 1.16 ns delay, and tunes her VOA
to make the flux hitting Bob’s SPD be close to 890 pho-
tons/pulse if the phase difference between Eve-Alice and
Bob is 0, and also controls her OS to ensure the counts
of Bob’s SPD are nearly unchanged. The experimental
results are shown in Fig. 5, which present Bob’s detec-
tion counts versus phase difference under different per-
spectives. The first histogram (blue one) at each phase
difference corresponds to the normal operation without
Eve, the phase difference is between Alice and Bob. The
second and third histograms correspond to the case with
ATR attack, the phase difference in the second one (or-
ange one) is between Eve (Eve-Alice) and Bob, and in
the third one (red one) is between Alice and Bob. It is
obvious that Eve has totally controlled Bob’s SPD, and
the statistical counts between Bob and Alice are almost
identical before and after ATR attack. More importantly,
QBER of the QKD system is nearly unchanged after be-
ing attacked. According to the second histogram (orange
one) at each phase difference and Eq. (1), QBER under
ATR attack is approximately 0.48 %, which originates
from imperfections of Eve’s apparatus and characteristic
of ATR of Bob’s SPD. At the position of 1.16 ns delay
with 890 photon/pulse full incident flux, Pf = 26.2%,
Ph = 0.083%, if Eve’s apparatus were perfect, the QBER
introduced by ATR attack is approximately 0.31 % ac-
cording to Eq. (2). Based on the ATR attack, Eve can
obtain all information of the secure keys by hiding her
presence in QBER of the QKD system, since the QBER
introduced by this attack is small enough.
Here we want to emphasize that the goal of research
on quantum hacking is to enhance the practical security
of QKD, though the way of openly discovering and clos-
ing security loopholes [21], the ATR attack experiment
is demonstrated in a proof-in-principle manner with only
one SPD. Since the ATR attack is time-sensitive, the ef-
fectiveness of this attack would be reduced if two or more
SPDs were used in the QKD system and they had differ-
ent properties in the ATR. For example, with the incident
flux of 890 photons/pulse, the chosen hacking position
for the commercial SPD is at the delay of 1.16 ns, the
QBER introduced by Eve is approximately 0.31 %; while
the chosen hacking position for the homemade SPD is
at the delay of 1.09 ns, the QBER introduced by Eve is
approximately 0.49 %. For these two SPDs, the hack-
ing positions have a time mismatch of 0.07 ns. However,
this mismatch could be compensated by exploiting the
weakness of the calibration routine[48], which has been
proposed by Jain et al. In reference [48], Eve causes a
temporal separation up to 0.45 ns between two SPDs in
a commercial QKD system.
IV. COUNTERMEASURES
In the ATR attack, Eve resends the attacking pulses to
the ATR of Bob’s SPD, and totally controls the detector.
Several countermeasures have been proposed to defeat
the detector control attacks. We first discuss some exist-
ing possible countermeasures against the ATR attack.
Monitoring the photocurrent of the APD is an effec-
tive way to detect most detector control attacks[30, 32],
since these attacks would leave an obvious fingerprint
of high photocurrent (more than 40 times stronger than
the one under normal operation). But in ATR attack,
the photocurrent could be equal to or even less than the
5one under normal operation. Suppose the photocurrent
per detection count with full and half incident flux are
if and ih, respectively, which can be obtained when we
measure the detection probability of Bob’s SPD under
full and half incident flux. Eve-Alice resends M attack-
ing pulses per second, and Bob gets C detection counts,
then C = C0 + Cpi/2 + Cpi + C3pi/2 ' 14M(Pf + 2Ph). If
Bob monitored the photocurrent of his SPD, the average
photocurrent would be
Iavg =
C(Pf · if + 2Ph · ih)
Pf + 2Ph
, (3)
where the background photocurrent of SPD has been ne-
glected. To measure the photocurrent characteristic un-
der ATR attack, id201 was replaced by the similar home-
made SPD, and the attacking position was changed from
1.16 ns to 1.09 ns delay. With different incident fluxes,
the corresponding detection probability (black points),
the average photocurrent (red points) and the QBER
(blue points) are shown in Fig. 6. The red dashed line
denotes the average photocurrent under normal opera-
tion with the value of 5.7 nA, and the corresponding
detection count is approximately 9.11 × 103 per second.
When the incident flux is 890 photons/pulse, the pho-
tocurrent per detection count with full and half flux are
0.287 pA/count and 33.832 pA/count, respectively. The
average photocurrent is about 5.6 nA, and QBER is less
than 0.5 %. From the point of view of the average pho-
tocurrent and QBER, it is hard to detect the ATR at-
tack. When the incident flux is further increased, the
average photocurrent would decrease in condition that
the detection count keeps unchanged. Thus monitoring
the average photocurrent is ineffective to detect the ATR
attack.
FIG. 6. The detection probability, average photocurrent
(Iavg) and QBER versus incident flux. The detection proba-
bility is measured in the experiment. The average photocur-
rent is calculated with Eq. (3) based on the measured pho-
tocurrents per detection if and ih and detection probabilities
Pf and Ph, in condition that Bob’s detection count remains
the same as the one in normal operation. QBER introduced
by the ATR attack is calculated according to Eq. (2) based
on the measured detection probabilities Pf and Ph.
In the second approach, afterpulses caused by macro-
scopic APD current are non-negligible [32]. For instance,
the afterpulse probability increased from 1.79 % to 76.6 %
after the after-gate attack [33]. For id201 in the QKD sys-
tem under ATR attack in Sec. III, the incident flux at the
position of 1.16 ns are {890, 445, 0, 445} photons/pulse
with equal probability, respectively, corresponding to the
four phase differences { 0, pi2 , pi, 3pi2 } between Eve-Alice
and Bob. Following the method proposed by Yuan et al.
[46], the afterpulse probability is measured with the value
of 0.57 %, which is consistent with the low QBER under
ATR attack. So the second approach is also ineffective
to find the ATR attack.
FIG. 7. Check detection counts at the gate and at the
removed gate. The SPD is triggered with 1 MHz rate and
illuminated by a laser pulse train with 2 MHz rate. (a) The
laser pulse train arrives at the zero point in the gate with 0.1
photons/pulse. (b) The laser pulse train arrives at 1.16 ns
delay with 890 photons/pulse. The timing resolution is 16 ps.
A third possible countermeasure is randomly removing
gates and checking clicks at the positions without gates
[26], which is based on the property that clicks still occur
under attacks. The effectiveness of this countermeasure
against ATR attack is checked by the following experi-
ment: the SPD id201 is triggered with 1 MHz repetition
rate, and illuminated by a pulse train with 2 MHz rate,
this is equivalent to remove half of 2 MHz gates. In
normal case, the pulse train with 0.1 photons/pulse flux
arrives at the zero point (with maximum detection prob-
ability). The temporal distribution of normalized detec-
tion counts is shown in Fig. 7(a), clicks only occur with
gates, and there are no clicks at the removed gates. In
ATR attack case, the pulse train with 890 photons/pulse
flux arrives at the position of 1.16 ns delay. The corre-
sponding temporal distribution of normalized detection
counts is shown in Fig. 7(b), which is similar with nor-
mal case, there are still no clicks at the removed gates.
Since the output of the ATR attacking pulse mainly de-
pends on the avalanche gain factor of APD, if the gate
was removed, the gain factor would be very small, no
clicks would occur. Hence removing gate is also invalid
to detect the ATR attack.
The three existing countermeasures cannot effectively
detect the proposed ATR attack. However, we found that
the temporal distribution of detection counts under ATR
attack is different from the one under normal operation.
The temporal distribution of detection counts of id201 is
6FIG. 8. Temporal distribution of normalized detection
counts. The timing resolution is 1 ps.
measured with 1 ps timing resolution, as shown in Fig.
8. Under normal operation (blue one in Fig. 8), the
detector is illuminated by 0.1 photons/pulse incident flux
at the zero point. Under ATR attack (red one in Fig. 8),
the detector is illuminated by 890 photons/pulse incident
flux at 1.16 ns delay position. The temporal distribution
of detection counts under normal operation is relatively
concentrated in a small range (from -0.05 ns to 0.05 ns).
While, the temporal distribution under ATR attack is
relatively widespread (from -0.05 ns to 0.15 ns), and its
center is delayed about 0.043 ns. These differences might
be an approach to find ATR attack.
Additionally, since the avalanche gain factor in the
ATR of APD is time-sensitive, QBER of the QKD sys-
tem introduced by ATR attack would increase if the time
jitter of the gate become large. For instance, when the
setting of id201-“ Trigger delay ” -is changed from “ By-
pass ” to “ Set 15 ns ”, the full-width at half-maximum
of the time jitter of the gate (through measuring the “
Gate out ” signal) increases from 19 ps to 65 ps. Then
at the position of 1.16 ns delay, the detection probabil-
ity with 890 photons/pulse incident flux increases from
26.2 % to 97.6 %, and the one with half flux (445 pho-
tons/pulse) increases from 0.083 % to 44.9 %, now the
QBER introduced by ATR attack increases up to 24 %.
Still, Eve could change the incident flux to reduce her
introduced QBER. If the full incident flux is changed to
400 photons/pulse, the detection probability is 31.3 % for
full flux, and 0.56 % for half flux, the QBER introduced
by ATR attack is about 1.7 %.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose and demonstrate an at-
tack strategy exploiting the characteristic of ATR of the
gated-mode SPD. The proposed ATR attack is a gen-
eral challenge for QKD systems employing APD-based
detectors operated in the gated-mode. Through choos-
ing proper attacking position in ATR and incident flux
of attacking pulses, Eve could almost completely control
Bob’s detector. In the attacking experiment on the plug-
and-play QKD system, detection counts with different
phase differences and QBER are identical before and af-
ter the ATR attack. Since the QBER introduced by Eve
is less than 0.5 %, Eve could hide her presence in the orig-
inal error under the normal operation. And also, three
existing countermeasures against detector control attacks
are invalid to detect the proposed ATR attack. However,
based on the experimental observations, we propose pos-
sible countermeasures to reveal the attack. The ATR
attack highlights the importance of detection signals in
practical QKD systems.
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